



OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

MAY 21 12 56 PM '75

21 May 1975

INTELLIGENCE

DCI/IS 75-1995

OSD Declassification/Release Instructions on File

LTG Samuel V. Wilson  
Deputy to the DCI for the  
Intelligence Community  
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear LTG Wilson:

New Business for 20 May Meeting of the NSCIC Working Group

Ambassador Ellsworth requested that I forward the following comments and suggestions regarding the 20 May meeting of the NSCIC Working Group, and possible new business for future meetings.

1. Status of Committees on Consumer Evaluation and Consumer Guidance

These committees could be highly useful. The committee for "Consumer Evaluation of Current Intelligence Products" represents an important step forward in developing the kind of detailed consumer evaluation of the intelligence product which is essential to support the NSCIC, and to provide the Intelligence Community with a user view of its output. Such a committee could not only establish suitable procedures for obtaining user views from different agencies, but serve as a mechanism for evaluating major products. The "Consumer Guidance" committee also seems useful, and could serve a valuable purpose in giving the Intelligence Community a better view of the needs of different agencies for given intelligence products, and for substantive detail in providing intelligence on given subjects. This committee might be particularly useful in reviewing the scheduling of major intelligence products relative to the KIQA, Objectives, and needs of given consumers.

A proposal for setting up such committees was originally scheduled to be distributed to members of the NSCIC Working Group by 15 April. It would be helpful to have such a proposal as soon as possible so that it can be discussed at the next meeting of the Working Group.

Classified by DASD(R&M)  
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF  
EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652. EXEMPTION CATEGORY 3  
DECLASSIFY ON: Impossible to determine

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Approved For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP84B00506R000100120014-7

2. Date of the Next Meeting

It would be helpful if the next meeting of the NSCIC/WG could be timed so that members had an opportunity to review NIAM 35/36 before the meeting. We would like to discuss this NIAM, and to present a draft "critique" as requested in your note of 11 March, 1975.

3. Need for An Annotated Bibliography of NIEs, SNIEs, NIAMs, and NSSM Support Products

It became apparent in surveying various components of OSD that national intelligence products are not being properly utilized because no adequate bibliography exists of such documents. We have looked into this problem, and the situation can be summarized as follows:

-- We have surveyed OSD views towards user review of NIEs, SNIEs, and NIAMs. We strongly endorse this idea. We have selected NIAM 35/36 for initial review and we have determined other documents for future review. We are developing methodology for user review.

-- We found in doing this survey that we have a major problem in OSD because no useful or timely annotated bibliography exists of NIEs, NIAMs, and SNIEs. The overall impact of the national intelligence effort is sharply reduced by poor information flow caused by lack of a timely way to survey overall intelligence effort, a lack of staff knowledge of national level products, and a lack of any way to learn what has been done in the past.

-- The DIA USIB library tried to create an index of NIEs, SNIEs, and NIAMs for us. We found its holdings had serious gaps; and were sometimes out of date.

-- We found some products not getting to key staffs in PA&E, ISA (P/P) and DDR&E because they only need these for specific studies and have no timely or comprehensive index to consult.

-- There used to be a comprehensive index of NIEs, SNIEs, and NIAMs until 1964. It was not annotated and was not organized into functional categories.

-- There is now only an annual index of NIEs, SNIEs, and NIAMs which comes out only three months after end of year surveyed. It does not show previous products not updated during that year (USIB-D-17.15, Estimates published during 1974, 5 March 1975).

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-- DIA does have an excellent semi-annual and annotated index of DIEs, SDIEs, DIAMs, and DIEMs (DIA, "Estimates Publications List," S-2008/DE-X (S)) published in last six months. It also lists all documents published in last five years.

This lack of a proper and timely annotated bibliography of national intelligence documents should be corrected as soon as possible. Accordingly, we request that the IC Staff take the following steps to solve the problem:

-- Immediately add an attachment of the DCI "Status of Work in Progress Report" which lists all products produced since the period covered in USIB-D-17.15.

-- Prepare a sample annotated bibliography of the type developed by DIA in S-2008/DE-X(S) for the period since USIB-D-17.15 and present this at the next meeting of the NSCIC/WG.

-- Begin development of a comprehensive annotated bibliography of the national intelligence product. This should include all documents not updated in the last five years. It should include a future production schedule for the coming 12 months. It should be updated semi-annually, and it should have a specific listing of all regularly scheduled products not updated during the last year.

This document will not only be a major step forward in solving the information flow problem, but provide the NSCIC and NSCIC/WG with an overview of the national product effort.

#### 4. The FY 76 Key Intelligence Questions

OSD is developing a package of user comments on the FY 76 KIQs. The main result of surveying users has, however, been to indicate that many do not feel that the KIQs are important enough to merit detailed review. The FY 75 KIQs are felt to be so general that they do not provide meaningful guidance. Further, the KIQ strategy reports suffer from the same problem. They do not address what substantive issues or data needs should be addressed in answering the KIQ, and they do not evaluate whether the products listed actually answer the KIQ. Instead, they associate all related output to a given KIQ, and make the volume of related output the measure of success.

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DIA is providing a coordinated DoD input for the FY 76 KIQs in the form of Defense Key Intelligence Questions. Unlike the present KIQs, these provide (a) a rationale for asking the question, (b) a detailed listing of the substantive data needed to answer the question in the form of "Sub-DKIQs," and (c) an indication of priorities. Such a format is distinctly preferable to that of the FY 75 KIQs. It is particularly important that the FY 76 KIQs list in detail the substantive areas where improved intelligence is required to answer the question. Accordingly, it would be useful if the IC Staff would examine the format of the DKIQs as soon as they are submitted by DIA, and present ideas for improving the format of the KIQs at the next meeting of the NSCIC/WG.

It would also be useful if the IC Staff could present a staff paper with an evaluation of the effectiveness of the KIQ system, and a clearer explanation of how the KIQs are derived. This should contain the following information:

- The views of the individual NIOs and a sampling of key users to see how valuable they felt the FY 75 KIQs were as guidance to the community.

- A detailed analysis of how many NIEs, NIAMs, SNIEs generated since the issuing of FY 75 KIQs were specifically in response to KIQs or were in response to other forms of specific tasking. Do the KIQs really guide the community?

- A description of how various agency inputs are combined into KIQs, of who chooses which inputs are made into KIQs, and of how these choices are made.

##### 5. The KIQ FY 75 Evaluation Performance Report

It is not clear that the present structure of the KEP is what is required, or that the effort involved is justified. The detailed formats included in the KEP questionnaire may be of uncertain value, and could result in the KEP effort being little more than a "paper chase." It would be useful if the IC Staff could prepare an analysis of the KEP process which deals with the following issues.

- Which staffs used the KIQs? Were the FY 75 KIQs adequate?

- What kind of user review of KIQ performance would be most useful? Should the NIOs be tasked with surveying users in filling out an improved KEP?

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-- Should the NIOs be involved in this kind of resource analysis related activity?

-- Is an updated KIQ Strategy Report really all the review effort required? Is the KEP worth its cost?

-- Are the KIQs specific and detailed enough to justify and permit detailed audit trails of the type the KEP system calls for?

-- Does the KEP system for relating levels of effort, costs, and collection means to specific KIQs produce meaningful data?

-- Would sampling techniques, including product evaluation and user reactions, produce more valuable results?

#### 6. The "Family of Intelligence Documents"

It may be helpful to clarify in more detail the comments Mr. Ellsworth made on this document. The present draft should be expanded to:

-- Describe who writes the document, how it is written, whose views and inputs are solicited, and how user views are surveyed and taken into account.

-- Describe the planning cycle involved, and how it relates to the budget cycle and impacts on intelligence resource requirements.

-- Describe how the documents are used in the Intelligence Community, their impact, and who they influence.

It would also be helpful if the IC Staff could survey user reactions to the value and success of the current documents, and if the informal comments of the individual NIOs on the value and success of each document could be surveyed and presented to members of the Working Group in the near future.

#### 7. The Problem of Expressing Uncertainty in Intelligence Estimates

The importance of this IC Staff paper cannot be over-emphasized, and it must not be generated in the form of a "broad brush" treatment, or gloss over the problems involved. A brief review of national intelligence products indicates that far too many:

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-- Fail to explicitly state the limitations in the intelligence available or the methods of analysis used and present them in summary form for quick review. In many cases, even those limitations that are listed are buried in the text or listed only in footnotes or annexes.

-- Fail to explicitly describe the methodology used when hard intelligence data is lacking.


-- Fail to clearly distinguish reasonable conclusions or logical views from conclusions based on intelligence.

-- Fail to describe the uncertainty present in given data, methods of analysis, or conclusions.

-- Fail to quantify uncertainty, fail to describe the method used to quantify uncertainty, or fail to show a range of numbers.

-- Fail to list the explicit intelligence data on which a conclusion is based, and provide only a broad or vague rationale.

The IC Staff paper should specifically address these problems. It should also survey the last year's output, and specifically list those documents where it is felt such problems did not occur. It should not simply survey the methods being used in the Community. It should specifically identify the specific products to which they were applied, and it should indicate the percentage of total annual output in which such methodologies were applied.



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